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ABSTRACT___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intermediate goods make up a large share of world trade.  Yet trade models with 
heterogeneous firms focus almost exclusively on firms’ export decisions rather than their 
import decisions.  We develop an analytically solvable model of a small open economy in 
which heterogeneous firms make endogenous import decisions.  We view decisions about 
importing as decisions about technology adoption.  In our model, firms weigh the benefit 
of operating a technology that uses imported intermediate goods against the fixed cost of 
developing trade relationships with foreign input suppliers.  Similar to the selection effect 
in standard export-decision models, only the most efficient firms choose to import.  In 
addition, the model features a technology upgrading effect, where importing improves a 
firm’s labor efficiency.  The calibrated model quantifies the selection and technology 
upgrading effects, captures the large performance advantage associated with using 
imported intermediate goods, and generates large increases in trade from small decreases 
in tariffs. 
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Introduction 
A large and increasing share of international trade is trade in intermediate goods.1  
Yet almost all models of trade with heterogeneous firms focus on a firm’s decision to 
export.  In these models, a firm decides whether to pay a fixed cost in order to sell its 
good in a foreign market.  This modeling approach began with Melitz (2003) and has 
been extended in numerous ways.2
We too develop a model with heterogeneous firms and fixed costs of trade, but 
our focus is on a firm’s decision to import intermediate goods.  Our model complements 
Melitz-style models that emphasize firms’ export decisions.  While import and export 
decisions may be related in some ways, they involve fundamentally different 
considerations by firms.  In making export decisions, firms must consider the 
characteristics of foreign markets and the costs involved in entering those markets.  In 
making import decisions, firms must consider how the use of imported intermediate 
goods will affect their production processes and weigh this against the costs of 
developing business relationships with foreign input suppliers. 
  The Melitz model has become one of the workhorse 
models of international trade, allowing economists to better understand firms’ export 
decisions and the effects of trade liberalization on an economy’s industrial organization. 
Our model is motivated by, and consistent with, data on plants’ importing 
behavior.  Using recent plant-level data on Chilean manufacturing firms, we document a 
basic set of facts.  Importers differ sharply from non-importers.  Plants that use imported 
intermediate goods are much larger and more productive than plants that do not.  Despite 
the apparent performance advantage associated with using imported inputs, only a small 
fraction of plants do, and, even among importers, imported intermediate goods do not 
make up a majority of total expenditure on intermediate goods.3
                                                 
1 See, for example, Feenstra (1998) and Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001). 
  We adopt a simple 
interpretation of these facts: most producers would prefer to use some imported 
intermediate inputs in production, but there are fixed costs that discourage most from 
2 Helpman (2006) provides a survey of this literature. 
3 These facts appear to be robust across countries.  See, for example, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for 
the United States, Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) for Colombia, Castellani, Serti, and Tomasi (2009) for 
Italy, and Muûls and Pisu (2009) for Belgium. 
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doing so.  These fixed costs are the costs of developing business relationships with 
foreign input suppliers. 
Fundamental to our modeling approach is the idea that firms’ import decisions are 
really decisions about technology adoption.  Each firm must decide how using imported 
intermediate goods will affects its production process and its performance.  There is a 
growing literature providing evidence that using imported intermediate goods enhances 
firm or plant performance.  This includes research by Amiti and Konings (2007), 
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009), Kugler and 
Verhoogen (2009), and Gibson and Graciano (2011).  Our aim is to model this 
phenomenon in a simple way and use the model to better understand, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, the effects of trade liberalizations, improvements in the terms of trade, 
and decreases in trade costs.  We keep the model simple enough that there is an exact 
analytic solution for the equilibrium, yet rich enough that we can quantitatively capture 
some important features of the data. 
We develop a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with a 
continuum of single-plant firms.  These firms exhibit two forms of heterogeneity: they 
differ in their levels of efficiency and in whether or not they use imported intermediate 
goods.  The first form of heterogeneity is the result of random draws, as in Hopenhayn 
(1992).  The second is endogenously decided by each firm.  Each firm chooses between 
two technologies: a technology that uses only domestic inputs and a technology that uses 
a combination of domestic and imported inputs.  The fixed cost of operating the 
technology that uses imported intermediate inputs is higher, reflecting the additional costs 
of developing business relationships with foreign input suppliers.  The technology that 
uses imported intermediate goods is superior, in the sense that every firm would choose it 
if there were no additional fixed cost of doing so.  The total benefit of using this 
technology is increasing in a firm’s scale of operation, while the operating cost is fixed. 
In the model, as in the data, importers are very different from non-importers.  The 
model provides a simple way of accounting for these differences.  Because of the fixed 
cost of importing, only the firms with the highest efficiency draws choose to import.  
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This is the usual selection effect emphasized by Melitz (2003) in the context of exporting.  
In addition, our model has what we refer to as a technology upgrading effect: a firm that 
opts for the technology using some imported inputs over the technology using only 
domestic inputs increases its output, employment, expenditure on intermediate inputs, 
and variable profits.  The technology upgrading effect is analogous to “learning by 
importing,” where the very act of importing leads to improved firm performance.  
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), among others, provide evidence of this effect. 
To obtain the quantitative implications of the theory, we calibrate the model using 
the Chilean manufacturing data described earlier.  The model does a good job of 
replicating the basic facts that we document, including the large performance advantage 
associated with importing.  Importantly, the calibrated model allows us to account for the 
relative contributions of the selection and technology upgrading effects in accounting for 
this performance advantage. 
We use the model to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the effects of tariff 
reduction, terms-of-trade improvement, and trade-cost reduction.  These sorts of changes 
lead to a process of reallocation across firms: the least efficient firms exit, the most 
efficient non-importers become importers, and aggregate technological efficiency 
increases.  In many ways this process of reallocation resembles what Melitz (2003) finds 
in his export-decision model.  In our model, however, the effects of the reallocation 
following trade liberalization are augmented through the technology upgrading effect.  
This leads to an improvement in labor efficiency at importing firms.  This feature of the 
model agrees well with the evidence of, for example, Amiti and Konings (2007), who 
study the effects of trade liberalization on Indonesian plants. 
Comparing standard trade models with the data, Yi (2003) and Kehoe (2005) 
stress the need to develop models that can generate large increases in trade in response to 
small decreases in tariffs.  Our model does this.  Ruhl (2004) and Chaney (2008) stress 
the importance of the extensive margin in Melitz-style export-decision models.  We stress 
the importance of the extensive margin in our import-decision model.  In response to 
trade liberalization, many non-importers switch technologies to become importers.  With 
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this extensive margin, we can generate the sort of large aggregate Armington elasticity 
(the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods) found in the data 
without assuming unusually large elasticities at the level of an individual firm. 
There are few other general equilibrium models that incorporate the importing 
decisions of firms.  Ramanarayanan (2007) builds a dynamic model in which entering 
firms make irreversible decisions about their import status in the presence of aggregate 
and idiosyncratic uncertainty.  He uses the model to contrast the effects of business-cycle 
shocks and trade liberalizations on the Armington elasticity.  Kasahara and Lapham 
(2008) consider both the decision to export and the decision to import.  They develop a 
dynamic model in which firms face stochastic fixed costs of importing in addition to a 
fixed cost of exporting.  Gopinath and Neiman (2011) build a model of heterogeneous 
firms to analyze changes in use of imported intermediate goods during large crises.  They 
show how changes in inputs at the firm level can affect measured productivity.  By 
contrast to these papers, we isolate the decision to import and develop a simple, static, 
non-stochastic, competitive model that has an exact analytic solution.  This allows for a 
high degree of transparency in our analysis of trade liberalization and provides a 
modeling framework that can be readily extended and applied. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we discuss our data and 
some basic facts on importing behavior.  In the third section, we develop the model.  In 
the fourth and fifth sections, we qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the model.  The 
sixth section concludes. 
 
Data 
 Here we document a basic set of facts that we would like our model to be able to 
quantitatively replicate.  These facts concern the extent to which producers use imported 
intermediate goods and how producers that use imported intermediate goods differ from 
those that do not.  We take these facts from the annual census of manufacturing plants 
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conducted by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas during the period 2001 to 2006.4
From 2001 to 2006, the census surveyed a total of 8,014 different manufacturing 
plants.  To be consistent with our model, which is static, we omit from our sample the 
plants that changed their import status over this period.
  
The census is detailed: it includes data on plants’ employment, gross output, value added, 
and expenditures, including expenditures on domestically produced intermediate goods 
and imported intermediate goods.  All monetary values in the census are expressed in an 
inflation-adjusted unit of account, the Chilean Unidad de Fomento. 
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  We categorize the remaining 
6,936 plants as follows.  Importers are plants that purchased imported raw materials 
every year that they participated during the period; they are 13 percent of our sample.  
Non-importers are plants that did not purchase imported raw materials in any year that 
they participated during the period; they are 87 percent of our sample.  When we 
calculate averages, we average over every relevant plant-year observation.  We document 
four basic facts about plants’ importing behavior. 
Fact 1.  Most plants do not import.  Importers are only 13 percent of our sample. 
 
Fact 2.  Importers spend more on domestically produced intermediate goods than on 
imported intermediate goods.  In our sample, expenditure on imported intermediate goods 
is 39 percent of the average importer’s total expenditure on intermediate goods. 
 
Fact 3.  Importers are much larger than non-importers.  In terms of gross output, 
expenditure on intermediate goods, value added, and employment, importers are, on 
average, 4.0 to 5.2 times larger than non-importers. 
 
                                                 
4 A previous version of this census was examined by Liu (1993), Levinsohn (1999), Pavcnik (2002), and 
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), among others. 
5 These plants are 13 percent of the original sample.  For an empirical analysis of plants that switch import 
status, see Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008).  Gibson and Graciano (2011) develop a quantitative dynamic 
general equilibrium model with switchers. 
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Fact 4.  Importers are more productive than non-importers.  Importers have 1.3 times 
higher value added per worker than non-importers. 
 
These facts may seem contradictory.  There appears to be a large performance 
advantage associated with importing, yet most plants do not import and those that do 
typically spend more on domestically produced intermediate goods than on imported 
intermediate goods.  We next develop a model that has the potential to account for these 
facts. 
 
Model 
There is a small open economy that competitively produces and exports a single 
good and imports a differentiated good from the rest of the world.  Because the economy 
is small relative to the rest of the world, it takes the relative price of the two goods as 
given.  The good produced by the small open economy, which serves as the numéraire, 
may used in four different ways: for consumption, for export (the rest of the world has 
elastic demand for it), for payment of fixed costs, and as an intermediate input.  The good 
is produced by a continuum of heterogeneous single-plant firms.  The small open 
economy’s government may impose an ad valorem tariff on the imported good. 
 
Consumer 
 There is a representative consumer in the economy who is endowed with L  units 
of labor.  The consumer supplies labor inelastically and spends all income on 
consumption.  The consumer’s budget constraint is 
 C wL T= + , (1) 
where C  is consumption, w  is the wage, and T  is the lump-sum rebate of tariff revenue. 
 
Firms 
 There is a continuum of single-plant firms in the economy.  These firms exhibit 
two forms of heterogeneity: they differ in their levels of efficiency and in whether or not 
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they use imported intermediate goods.  The first form of heterogeneity is the result of 
random draws, while the second is endogenously decided by each firm. 
A firm’s actions are as follows.  After paying the fixed cost of entry, the firm 
takes an efficiency draw from a probability distribution.  The firm then has three options: 
not to operate, to operate using a technology that does not require imported inputs, or to 
operate using a technology that requires imported inputs.  All firms face decreasing 
returns to scale, so firms with different efficiency levels can coexist, with each firm 
operating at its optimal scale.  Each firm does, however, face a fixed cost of operating, so 
the firms with the worst draws may choose not to operate at all. 
Fundamental to our model is the characterization of firms’ technologies.  Let 
technology N  be the technology of a non-importer and let technology I  be the 
technology of an importer.  The technologies are similar, but differ along important 
dimensions.  Technology N  uses only labor and the domestically produced intermediate 
good as inputs, while technology I  uses labor, the domestically produced intermediate 
good, and the imported intermediate good as inputs.  For each technology, the extent of 
diminishing returns is determined by the parameter ν , where 0 1ν< < .  The total factor 
productivity with which a firm operates technology N  is given by its efficiency draw, a , 
while the total factor productivity with which a firm operates technology I  is given by 
aη , where 0η > .  Operating either technology requires payment of a fixed cost.  We 
assume that the fixed cost of operating technology I  is greater than the fixed cost of 
operating technology N .  This assumption captures the idea that there are additional 
costs involved in developing business relationships with foreign input suppliers relative 
to domestic input suppliers.  Next we specify the two technologies. 
 First consider a firm with efficiency a  operating technology N .  The firm’s 
output is given by 
 ( )1( ) ( ), ( )N N N Ny a a a d a
ννψ−=  , (2) 
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where ( , )Nψ ⋅ ⋅  is a standard production function with constant returns to scale, ( )N a  is 
the input of labor, and ( )Nd a  is the input of the domestically produced intermediate 
good.  The firm’s profits are 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N N N Na y a w a d aπ φ= − − − , (3) 
where w  is the wage and Nφ  is the fixed cost of operating.  To maximize profits, the firm 
chooses ( )N a  and ( )Nd a  to solve 
 ( ) ( )11 ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) 0N N N N N Na a d a a d a w
ννν ψ ψ−− − =

   (4) 
 ( ) ( )11 ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ) 1 0N N N Nd N Na a d a a d a
ννν ψ ψ−− − =  , (5) 
where /Nk N kψ ψ= ∂ ∂ , ,k d=  . 
 Now consider a firm with efficiency a  operating technology I .  The firm’s 
output is given by 
 ( )1( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( )I I I I Iy a a a d a f a
ννη ψ−=  , (6) 
where ( , , )Iψ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is a standard production function with constant returns to scale, ( )I a  is 
the input of labor, ( )Id a  is the input of the domestically produced intermediate good, and 
( )If a  is the input of the imported intermediate good.  The firm’s profits are 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )I I I I I Ia y a w a d a pf aπ τ φ= − − − + − , (7) 
where p  is the relative price of the imported good (taken as given by the small open 
economy), τ  is the country’s ad valorem tariff on imports, and Iφ  is the fixed cost of 
operating.  To maximize profits, the firm chooses ( )I a , ( )Id a , and ( )If a  to solve 
 ( ) ( )11( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) 0I I I I I I I Ia a d a f a a d a f a w
ννν η ψ ψ−− − =

   (8) 
 ( ) ( )11( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) 1 0I I I I Id I I Ia a d a f a a d a f a
ννν η ψ ψ−− − =   (9) 
 ( ) ( )11( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) (1 ) 0I I I I If I I Ia a d a f a a d a f a p
ννν η ψ ψ τ−− − + =  , (10) 
where /Ik I kψ ψ= ∂ ∂ , , ,k d f=  . 
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 Given its efficiency draw, each firm decides whether to operate and, if so, which 
technology to use.  Firms’ operating decisions are as follows.  For a firm with efficiency 
draw a , the decision rule for operating technology N  is given by the indicator function 
 
1 if ( ) 0 and ( ) ( )
( )
0 otherwise
N N I
N
a a a
a
π π π
ι
≥ >
= 

 (11) 
and the decision rule for operating technology I  is given by the indicator function 
 [ ]1 if ( ) max ( ),  0( )
0 otherwise
I N
I
a a
a
π π
ι
 ≥
= 

. (12) 
The cost of firm entry is Mφ  units of output.  This entitles the firm to an efficiency 
draw from probability distribution ( )G ⋅ .  The expected value of entry must equal the cost 
of entry, so 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N I I Ma a dG a a a dG aι π ι π φ+ =∫ ∫ . (13) 
(Though (13) is typically referred to as a free-entry condition, it actually pins down the 
wage, rather than the measure of entrants, here.  The expected value of entry is not 
decreasing in the measure of entrants, as it would be in a model with monopolistic 
competition.)  This condition ensures that there are no aggregate profits in the economy.  
Let M  denote the measure of entrants. 
 
Market clearing 
 Define aggregate use of the domestically produced intermediate good as 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N I ID M a d a dG a a d a dG aι ι= +∫ ∫ . (14) 
Define aggregate use of the foreign intermediate good as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )I IF M a f a dG aι= ∫ . (15) 
Define aggregate output as 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N I IY M a y a dG a a y a dG aι ι= +∫ ∫ . (16) 
International balance of payments requires that 
 X pF= , (17) 
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where X  is aggregate exports.  Tariff revenue is rebated to the consumer as a lump sum, 
so 
 T pFτ= . (18) 
Clearing in the labor market requires that 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N N I IM a a dG a a a dG a Lι ι+ =∫ ∫  . (19) 
Finally, clearing in the goods market requires that 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )M N N I IC D X M a dG a a dG a Yφ φ ι φ ι+ + + + + =∫ ∫ . (20) 
 
Equilibrium 
 Here we define an equilibrium and specify an algorithm for calculating it. 
 
Definition.  A competitive small open economy equilibrium is a list of aggregate 
measures Cˆ , Dˆ , Xˆ , Fˆ , Yˆ , and Mˆ ; a wage wˆ ; a transfer Tˆ ; and firm decision rules 
ˆ ( )Ny a , ˆ ( )Iy a , ˆ ( )N aπ , ˆ ( )I aπ , ˆ ( )N a , ˆ ( )I a , ˆ ( )Nd a , ˆ ( )Id a , ˆ ( )If a , ˆ ( )N aι , and ˆ ( )I aι  
such that (1)-(20) hold. 
 
The equilibrium is straightforward to calculate using the following algorithm.  
Taking w  as given, solve for ˆ ( )N a  and ˆ ( )Nd a  using (4) and (5), solve for ˆ ( )I a , 
ˆ ( )Id a , and ˆ ( )If a  using (8)-(10); calculate ˆ ( )Ny a  and ˆ ( )Iy a  using (2) and (6); calculate 
ˆ ( )N aπ  and ˆ ( )I aπ  using (3) and (7); and calculate ˆ ( )N aι  and ˆ ( )I aι  using (11) and (12).  
Solve for wˆ  using (13).  Solve for Mˆ  using (19).  Calculate Dˆ , Fˆ , and Yˆ  using (14)-
(16).  Calculate Xˆ  and Tˆ  using (17) and (18).  Finally, calculate Cˆ  using (1).  By 
Walras’s Law, (20) holds. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
 Here we make assumptions regarding functional forms and parameter values so 
that we can obtain an exact analytic solution for the equilibrium.  We consider various 
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qualitative properties of the model and then analyze the effects of tariff reduction, terms-
of-trade improvement, and trade-cost reduction. 
 
Further assumptions 
 First, we choose functional forms for the constant-returns-to-scale components of 
the production technologies.  We let 
 1( , )N d d
α αψ −=   (21) 
 ( )
1
( , , ) (1 )I d f d f
α
α ρ ρ ρψ µ µ
−
= + −  . (22) 
With these Cobb-Douglas functional forms, the elasticity of substitution between labor 
and intermediate goods is one for each firm.  This is consistent with our data, in the sense 
that expenditure shares for labor and intermediate goods by Chilean manufacturing plants 
over the period 2001 to 2006 were roughly constant.  We can think of importers as using 
a composite intermediate good, the quantity of which is given by 
 ( )1/( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )I I Iz a d a f a
ρρ ρµ µ= + − . (23) 
Here the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate goods is 
1/ (1 )ρ− .  The price of a unit of the composite intermediate good is then 
 ( )
1
1 1
1 1 1(1 ) (1 )P p
ρ
ρρ
ρ ρ ρµ µ τ
−
−
−− − −
 
= + − +  
 
. (24) 
 Second, we choose a functional form for the distribution of efficiency draws.  We 
follow Chaney (2008) in letting the distribution be Pareto: 
 ( ) 1 ( / )G a a γθ= − , (25) 
a θ≥ , where 0θ >  and 1γ > .  The size distribution of firms in the model is proportional 
to the distribution of efficiency draws.  As Figure 1 shows, the size distribution of plants 
in the data is consistent with a Pareto distribution. 
Third, we restrict our attention to the case where not all entering firms choose to 
operate and not all operating firms choose to import.  This leads to a characterization of 
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firms’ operating and technology decisions in terms of cutoff rules.  We denote the cutoff 
for operating by Na , where Na  satisfies 
 ( ) 0N Naπ = . (26) 
We assume that Nφ  is sufficiently large that Na θ> .  We denote the cutoff for importing 
by Ia , where Ia  satisfies 
 ( ) ( )I I N Ia aπ π= . (27) 
We assume that Iφ  is sufficiently large that I Na a> .  Under these assumptions, there is 
an exact analytic solution for the equilibrium, which we provide in Appendix 1.  In 
Appendix 2, we provide the solution under the assumption that the economy is in autarky. 
 
Costs and benefits of importing 
Each operating firm weighs the cost of importing against the benefit.  In our 
model, the net cost of importing is fixed at I Nφ φ−  units of output for each firm.  In 
contrast, the total benefit of importing is increasing in the firm’s scale of operation.  A 
firm that switches from technology N  to technology I  increases its output, employment, 
expenditure on intermediate goods, and variable profits (profits gross of fixed costs) by a 
factor of B , where 
 
(1 )
1B P
α ν
νη
−
−
−= . (28) 
(We are assuming that 1B > .)  We refer to B  as the benefit of importing.  An implication 
of (28) is that, in the context of this model, it does not matter whether the benefit of 
importing comes from a lower price or an efficiency advantage; only the combination of 
these factors matters.  Imported intermediates may be more expensive than domestic 
intermediates ( 1P > ), but there will be a benefit from using them if η  is sufficiently 
high.  Alternatively, imported intermediates may have an undesirable effect on firm 
efficiency ( 1η < ), but there will be a benefit from using them if P  is sufficiently low.  
The findings of Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) suggest that the first case is more 
consistent with the data than the second. 
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Sources of differences between importers and non-importers 
 In the data, importers are very different from non-importers.  In the model, there 
are two causes of this: a selection effect and a technology upgrading effect.  Because of 
the fixed cost, only the firms with the highest efficiency draws choose to become 
importers.  This is the selection effect.  If a firm chooses to use technology I , then its 
output, employment, expenditure on intermediate goods, and variable profits are larger by 
a factor of B  than if the firm had chosen to use technology N .  This is the technology 
upgrading effect. 
 We can measure the contribution of each effect to the relative size of importers 
(the measure of size can be gross output, employment, total expenditure on intermediate 
goods, or variable profits).  In the absence of any selection effect, technology upgrading 
would result in importers being B  times larger than non-importers.  The selection effect 
determines the extent to which the size ratio is greater than B .  Let S  be size of the 
average importer relative to the size of the average non-importer.  Using a logarithmic 
decomposition to account for this ratio, the share due to the technology upgrading effect 
is given by log / logB S ; the remaining share is due to the selection effect.  Later, our 
calibration procedure will pin down the magnitudes of these two effects. 
 
Aggregate technological efficiency 
Along with the benefit of importing, an important statistic in the model — it 
shows up in the calculation of every equilibrium object — is 
 ( )1 ( ) ( )I
N I
a
a a
M
A adG a B adG a
γφ
∞
= +∫ ∫ . (29) 
We refer to A  as an aggregate technological efficiency index because the expression in 
parentheses is a weighted average of firms’ efficiency draws.  The relative weight on 
importers, B , accounts for the benefit of using technology I .  Implicitly, the weight on 
firms that choose not to operate is zero.  Since the cutoffs Na  and Ia  are equilibrium 
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objects, we can simplify (29) to express aggregate technological efficiency entirely in 
terms of parameters: 
 
1/1 1( 1) ( )
( 1)
N I N
M
BA
γγ γ γφ φ φ
θ
γ φ
− − + − −
=  − 
. (30) 
 Aggregate technological efficiency affects many important aspects of the 
economy.  For example, aggregate output can be expressed as 
 
1
A KLY
ν
αν
αν
−
= , (31) 
where K  is given in Appendix 1.  The wage and the measure of entrants are also 
proportional to (1 )/A ν αν− , as is social welfare if 0τ = .  In addition, the cutoffs for 
operating and importing are proportional to A : 
 N Na Aφ=  (32) 
 ( )
1
I N
I
Aa
B
φ φ−
=
−
. (33) 
Notice that the cutoff for importing is increasing in the cost of importing and decreasing 
in the benefit of importing. 
 
Effects of tariff reduction, terms-of-trade improvement, and trade-cost reduction 
 In our experiments, we consider the effects of trade liberalization, as given by a 
decrease in τ ; an exogenous improvement in the terms of trade, as given by a decrease in 
p ; and a reduction in trade costs, as given by a decrease in Iφ .  Since our model is static, 
we view it as capturing the long-term effects of permanent changes.  These three types of 
changes have many qualitative effects in common. 
 
Proposition.  Tariff reduction, an improvement in the terms of trade, or a decrease in the 
cost of importing has the following effects: (i) the cutoff for operating increases, (ii) the 
cutoff for importing decreases, (iii) the (real) wage increases, (iv) output increases, (v) 
firm entry increases, and (vi) social welfare increases. 
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Proving the proposition just involves finding the signs of various partial 
derivatives using Appendix 1, so we omit it here.  A decrease in either τ  or p  decreases 
the price of the composite intermediate input, P , which increases the benefit of 
importing, B , which leads to an increase in aggregate technological efficiency, A  (see 
(24), (28), and (30)).  A decrease in Iφ  does not change P  or B  but, rather, directly 
increases A . 
As the proposition indicates, all the changes result in a reallocation of resources 
across firms.  The least efficient firms exit because they can no longer profitably operate 
at the higher wage, the most efficient non-importers become importers, and technological 
efficiency increases.  With a decrease in τ  or p , the effects of reallocation are 
augmented because, for a given efficiency draw, there is an increase in the optimal scale 
at which technology I  is operated and a decrease in the optimal scale at which 
technology N  is operated.  By contrast, with a decrease in Iφ , both technologies are 
operated at smaller scales due to the increase in the wage. 
 
Decomposing changes in trade volume 
 Yi (2003) and Kehoe (2005) stress the need to develop trade models that can 
generate large increases in trade in response to small decreases in tariffs.  Our model has 
this potential, as it has both extensive and intensive margins of importing.  The change in 
total imports resulting from a change in τ , p , or Iφ  can be decomposed into changes on 
three margins: (i) the measure of entrants, (ii) the cutoff for importing, and (iii) use of the 
imported good by existing operators of technology I .  Specifically, 
 log log (1 ) log logId F d M d a d Qγ= + − + , (34) 
where 
 ( ) /IQ f a a= . (35) 
(As Appendix 1 shows, ( )If a  is proportional to a , so Q  does not depend on a .)  The 
percentage change in existing importers’ use of the imported intermediate good is equal 
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to the percentage change in Q .  Thus the first two margins are extensive, while the third 
is intensive.  Importantly, with the presence of extensive margins, the Armington 
elasticity — the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods — is 
greater at the macro level than at the micro level.  As a result, the model has the potential 
to generate a large Armington elasticity at the macro level without assuming an unusually 
large elasticity at the micro level. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
 Here we calibrate the model using the data on the Chilean manufacturing sector 
discussed earlier.  Then we use the calibrated model to perform a number of 
counterfactual numerical experiments. 
 
Calibration 
 Our strategy for calibrating the model is as follows.  First, we normalize certain 
parameters that do not affect the quantitative findings in which we are interested.  Then 
we take some parameter values from the literature.  Finally, we select the remaining 
parameter values to match important statistics on plants’ importing behavior. 
 As normalizations, we set the labor endowment, L ; the lower bound on the Pareto 
distribution, θ ; and the cost of entry, Mφ , to one.  As (28) indicates, it does not matter 
whether the benefit of importing comes from a lower price or an efficiency advantage.  
Consequently, we normalize the price of the composite intermediate good, P , to one and 
initially allow the size of the benefit of importing to be determined by the parameter η .  
To obtain 1P = , we set the tariff rate, τ , to be consistent with the data and then choose 
the relative price of the imported intermediate good, p .  The World Bank’s World 
dataBank reports that Chile’s average tariff rate in 2001 was 8 percent, so we set 
0.08τ = .  Then we set 0.11p =  to obtain 1P = . 
 We take the values of ρ  and ν  from the literature.  There is debate over the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, the Armington elasticity.  
Ruhl (2004) tries to resolve this debate and argues in favor of an elasticity of two at the 
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micro level (measurements at the macro level differ when an extensive margin is 
involved).  Following this, we set 0.5ρ =  so that an importer’s elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign inputs is two.  The parameter ν  determines the degree of 
decreasing returns at the firm level.  Calibrating a competitive model with heterogeneous 
firms operating decreasing-returns-to-scale technologies, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) find 
that 0.85ν =  is consistent with data on U.S. manufacturing plants; we adopt this value 
here. 
The values of α  and µ  are selected to match expenditure shares in the data.  In 
the data, expenditure on labor as a share of expenditure on both labor and intermediate 
goods is 0.34, so we set 0.34α = .  Among plants that import, expenditure on imported 
intermediate goods as a share of total expenditure on intermediate goods is 0.39; we set 
0.78µ =  to match this. 
The remaining four parameters are the fixed cost of operating technology N , Nφ ; 
the fixed cost of operating technology I , Iφ ; the TFP of technology I  relative to 
technology N , η ; and the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, γ .  We jointly 
select the values of these four parameters so that the following four statistics hold in the 
model: (i) 13 percent of operating plants use imported intermediate goods, (ii) the 
average gross output of importers relative to non-importers is 4.5, (iii) the coefficient of 
variation for gross output is 6.0, and (iv) 90 percent of entrants choose to operate.6
1.05Nφ =
  The 
resulting parameter values are , 1.66Iφ = , 1.21η = , and 2.02γ = .  To place 
these numbers in context, consider the following.  The fixed cost of operating technology 
N  is 10 percent of the average non-importer’s gross output and 68 percent of its variable 
profits.  The fixed cost of operating technology I  is 4 percent of the average importer’s 
gross output and 24 percent of its variable profits.  Since 1.21B = , switching from 
technology N  to technology I  increases a firm’s gross output, employment, expenditure 
on intermediate goods, and variable profits by 21 percent.  Our value for the shape 
                                                 
6 The last statistic is not based on data (we do not observe plants that do not operate), but the quantitative 
results in which we are interested are not sensitive to the particular percentage chosen.  We simply need the 
cutoff for operating to be binding. 
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parameter of the Pareto distribution is consistent with the findings of Del Gatto, Mion, 
and Ottaviano (2007).  Table 1 summarizes the calibration. 
The calibrated model allows us to account for the average importer being 4.5 
times larger, in terms of gross output, than the average non-importer.  Using the 
decomposition discussed in the previous section, with 1.21B =  the share due to the 
selection effect is 87.4 percent and the share due to the technology upgrading effect is 
12.6 percent. 
The calibration guarantees that the model satisfies Facts 1 to 3.  We did not use 
Fact 4 in the calibration, but the calibrated model is not far off.  In the data, importers are 
1.3 times more productive than non-importers, as measured by value added per worker.  
In the calibrated model, importers are still substantially more productive than non-
importers, by a factor of 1.2.  It is worth pointing out that the ratio would be one if we did 
not take into account fixed costs of operation (as noted by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)).  
But our interpretation of the fixed costs is that they are expensed costs of setting up 
business relationships with input suppliers, so they must be subtracted from gross output 
to obtain value added.  Though I Nφ φ> , expenditure on fixed costs relative to average 
output is smaller for importers than non-importers.  Consequently, measured value added 
per worker is higher among importers than among non-importers.  Table 2 provides a 
comparison between the facts in the data and in the model. 
 
Experiments 
 We use the calibrated model to perform four numerical experiments: (i) 
elimination of the ad valorem tariff, (ii) an exogenous improvement in the terms of trade, 
(iii) a reduction in fixed costs, and (iv) going from autarky to free trade. 
 We set up the first two experiments to be of the same magnitude.  We consider (i) 
the elimination of the 8 percent tariff in the benchmark calibration and (ii) an equivalent 
reduction in the terms of trade (a 7.4 percent decrease in p ).  Table 3 presents the 
percentage changes in a number of statistics of interest.  These two experiments have 
almost identical quantitative results.  The only differences are with respect to the changes 
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in exports, consumption, and tariff revenue.  The main difference between the two 
experiments is that the tariff reduction results in the loss of all tariff revenue, while the 
terms-of-trade improvement increases tariff revenue.  Our index of social welfare is the 
consumption level.  Because of the changes in tariff revenue, the welfare gain from tariff 
elimination is much smaller than the welfare gain from the terms-of-trade improvement.  
The terms-of-trade improvement allows the economy to import just as much as after the 
tariff elimination, but without exporting as much output. 
 Both experiments result in a large increase in trade: the quantity of imports 
increases by 98.8 percent.  Using the decomposition given by (34), we find that 4.7 
percent of the increase is due to the change in the measure of entrants, 69.7 percent is due 
to the change in the cutoff for importing, and 25.6 percent is due to the change in existing 
importers’ use of the imported intermediate good.  Thus the extensive margins account 
for the majority of the increase.  In the benchmark calibration, of the firms that enter, 10 
percent choose not to operate, 78 percent choose to operate technology N , and 12 
percent choose to operate technology I .  Following the change, entry increases by 3.3 
percent and, of the firms that enter, 21 percent choose not to operate, 49 percent choose 
to operate technology N , and 30 percent choose to operate technology I  (see Table 4). 
When there are extensive margins, the Armington elasticity at the macro level is 
greater than the Armington elasticity at the micro level.  Here the Armington elasticity at 
the level of an individual firm is 2, while the measured aggregate Armington elasticity is 
10.5.  This large aggregate Armington elasticity is consistent with the empirical findings 
of researchers who estimate it using data from trade liberalizations.  As Ruhl (2004) 
notes, these researchers typically find Armington elasticities ranging from 4 to 15.  This 
experiment makes clear that the extensive margins play an important role in generating 
large increases in trade from small decreases in tariffs. 
 In addition to reporting how the changes affect our theoretical measure of 
technological efficiency, we also report how they affect measured real GDP.  To 
calculate real GDP in our model in a manner similar to the way real GDP is calculated in 
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the data, we use base-period prices.7 t  If we let  denote the current period, then real GDP 
at period-0 prices is 
 0 0 0 0(1 )t t t t N Nt I It tRGDP Y D p F M M p Fτ φ φ τ= − − + − − + , (36) 
where NM  is the measure of non-importers and IM  is the measure of importers.  The 
first term is gross output, the next four terms are expenditure on intermediate goods and 
expensed costs of operation, and the last term is the rebate of tariff revenue, all valued at 
period-0 prices.  We assume that investment in new firms is a tangible investment rather 
than an intermediate input, so these expenditures are not subtracted from gross output.  
The experiments result in a 1.5 percent increase in real GDP.  In contrast to Kehoe and 
Ruhl (2008), who find that terms of trade shocks have no first-order effect on real GDP in 
a small open economy model with a representative firm, we obtain a substantial increase 
in GDP by modeling heterogeneous firms and an extensive margin of importing. 
 The first two experiments involved increasing the benefit of importing.  The third 
experiment involves decreasing the fixed cost of importing, Iφ .  To make this experiment 
somewhat comparable in magnitude to the first two experiments, we select the percentage 
decrease in Iφ  so that the share of entrants that choose to operate technology I  is the 
same as after the previous two experiments (30 percent).  This requires a 14.2 percent 
decrease in Iφ .  The results are presented in Table 3.  Since B  does not change in this 
case, we can isolate the basic effects of reallocation.  The increase in aggregate 
technological efficiency is not as large as in the previous two experiments, so the changes 
are mostly smaller in magnitude. 
 Finally, we consider the extreme case of going from autarky to free trade.  In the 
free trade case, we take the relative price of the imported good from the benchmark 
calibration.  This experiment puts an upper bound on the effects of tariff reduction alone.  
The welfare gain is 5.2 percent.  Table 5 presents the changes in some statistics of 
interest. 
 
                                                 
7 See Gibson (2010), Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), and Bajona, Gibson, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2010) for further 
discussion of measured productivity and GDP in trade models. 
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Conclusion 
Most trade models with heterogeneous firms emphasize firms’ export decisions.  
We have developed a complementary approach that emphasizes firms’ import decisions.  
Our model has desirable qualitative properties, is straightforward to calibrate, and 
quantitatively captures many important features of plants’ importing behavior in the data.  
In terms of policy implications, the welfare gains from unilateral trade liberalization may 
not be large enough to persuade policymakers in countries that depend on tariffs for 
revenue.  Individuals associated with small non-importing firms are also unlikely to 
support liberalization.  Improvements in the terms of trade generate large welfare gains, 
but are external.  The simple modeling framework developed here allows for many 
interesting extensions.  These include the roles of dynamics, uncertainty, multiple 
countries, monopolistic competition, and joint import-export decisions.
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Table 1.  Summary of the calibration 
 
Parameters Values Explanations 
L  1 Normalization 
θ  1 Normalization 
Mφ  1 Normalization 
p  0.11 Chosen so that 1P =  
ρ  0.5 Ruhl (2004) 
ν  0.85 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) 
τ  0.08 World Bank’s World dataBank 
α  0.34 Expenditure on labor as a share of total expenditure on labor and intermediate goods 
µ  0.78 
Importers’ expenditure on imported 
intermediate goods as a share of total 
expenditure on intermediate goods: 0.39 
,  N Iφ φ , η , γ  1.05, 1.66, 1.21, 2.02 
Jointly chosen to match 4 statistics: (i) 
importers are 13 percent of operating plants, (ii) 
gross output of average importer relative to 
gross output of average non-importer is 4.5, (iii) 
coefficient of variation for gross output is 6.0, 
and (iv) 90 percent of entrants choose to operate 
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Table 2.  Data vs. model 
 
Statistic Data Model 
Importers as a share of operating plants (%) 13 13 
Average importer’s expenditure on imported 
intermediate goods as a share of total expenditure on 
intermediate goods (%) 
39 39 
Gross output of average importer relative to average 
non-importer 4.5 4.5 
Value added per worker of importers relative to non-
importers 1.3 1.2 
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Table 3.  Three experiments 
 
Statistic 
Tariff 
elimination 
(% change) 
Terms-of-trade 
improvement 
(% change) 
Fixed-cost 
reduction 
(% change) 
Welfare 1.0 5.1 2.4 
Wage 3.3 3.3 1.1 
Measure of entrants 3.3 3.3 1.1 
Output 3.3 3.3 1.1 
Tariff revenue −100.0 84.0 59.7 
Real GDP 1.5 1.5 2.2 
Price of composite intermediate −3.0 −3.0 0.0 
Imports 98.8 98.8 59.7 
Technological efficiency 6.4 6.4 2.2 
Benefit of importing 12.2 12.2 0.0 
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Table 4.  Entrants’ operating decisions (percentage shares) 
 
Decision Benchmark Tariff elimination 
Terms-of-
trade 
improvement 
Trade-cost 
reduction Autarky 
Not operate 10 21 21 14 3 
Operate 
technology N  78 49 49 56 97 
Operate 
technology I  12 30 30 30 0 
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Table 5.  Experiment: Going from autarky to free trade 
 
Statistic Percentage change 
Welfare 5.2 
Wage 5.2 
Measure of entrants 5.2 
Output 5.2 
Technological efficiency 10.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Figure 1.  Firm size distribution 
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Appendix 1.  Analytic solution with trade 
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Appendix 2.  Analytic solution under autarky 
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